Alle origini di una teoria economica della politica/Bibliografia

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Bibliografia

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Alle origini di una teoria economica della politica


A
  • Alberto Alesina (1988), “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Tow-Party System with Rational Voters”, American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 796-805.
  • Kenneth J. Arrow (1951), Social choice and individual values, New York: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Kenneth J. Arrow (1992), “General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice”. In Assar Lindbeck (a cura di), Economic sciences, 1969-1980: the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. Reperibile dal WWW: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1972/arrow-lecture.pdf (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
B
  • Gianfranco Baldini e Adriano Pappalardo (2004), Sistemi elettorali e partiti nelle democrazie contemporanee, 1a ed., Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli.
  • Enrico Barone (1937), Le opere economiche, vol. III: “Principi di economia finanziaria”, Bologna: Zanichelli.
  • Duncan Black (1948), “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, No. 1 , 23-34.
  • Duncan Black (1987), The Theory of Committees and Elections, 5a ed., Norwell (Mass.): Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Duncan Black (1998), The Theory of Committees and Elections e Duncan Black e Robert A. Newing, Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation, 2a ed. rivista, a cura di Iain McLean, Alistair MacMillan, Burt L. Monroe, prefazione di Ronald H. Coase, Norwell (Mass.): Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Douglas H. Blair e Robert A. Pollak (1983), “Rational Collective Choice”, Scientific American, Vol. 249, No. 2, 88-95.
  • André Blais (1988), “The Classification of Electoral Systems”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 16, n.1, 99-110.
  • James Buchanan (1995), “Interview with James Buchanan”, The Region, The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Reperibile nel WWW: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3682 (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
  • James M. Buchanan e Richard A. Musgrave (1999), Public finance and public choice: two contrasting visions of the State, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
C
  • Ronald H. Coase (1997), “The Institutional Structure of Production”. In Torsten Persson (a cura di), Economic sciences, 1991-1995: the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. Reperibile nel WWW: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
  • Roger D. Congleton (2004), “The Median Voter Model”. In Charles K. Rowley, Friedrich Schneider (a cura di), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2a ed., New York: Kluwer Academic Press. Reperibile nel WWW: http://rdc1.net/forthcoming/MEDIANVT.pdf.
D
  • Otto A. Davis, Morris H. DeGroot e Melvin J. Hinich (1972), “Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule”, Econometrica, Vol. 40, No. 1, 147-157.
  • Anthony Downs (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, 1a ed., New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
  • Patrick Dunleavy (1991), Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
E
  • David Easton (1953), The Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, New York: Knopf.
  • James M. Enelow e Melvin J. Hinich (1984), The Spatial Theory of Voting, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
F
  • Leon Felkins (ultima revisione 2009), “Introduction to Public Choice Theory”, A Rational Life: A Discussion of the Peculiar Consequences of Individuals Living in Groups. Reperibile nel WWW: http://perspicuity.net/sd/pub-choice.html (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
  • Robert H. Frank (2006), Microeconomics and Behavior, 6a ed., McGraw-Hill (tr. it. a cura di Romano Piras, Microeconomia, 4a ed., Milano: McGraw-Hill, 2007).
  • Milton Friedman (1953), The Methodology of Positive Economics. In id., Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
G
  • Gianluigi Galeotti (1995), “economia della politica”. In AA. VV., Enciclopedia dell’economia Garzanti, 2a ed., Milano: Garzanti.
  • Francesco Galgano (2007), La forza del numero e la legge della ragione. Storia del principio di maggioranza, Bologna: Il Mulino.
  • Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Samuel Merrill e Thomas Brunell (2001), “Changes in the location of the median voter in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963-1996”, Public Choice, Vol. 106, No. 3-4, 221-232.
H
  • Arye L. Hillman (2003), Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government, 1a ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Arye L. Hillman (2009), Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government, 2a ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Albert O. Hirschman (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.
  • Randall G. Holcombe (1989), “The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory”, Public Choice, Vol. 61, No. 2, 115-125.
  • Harold Hotelling (1929), “Stability in Competition”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 39, No. 153, 41-57.
L
  • David S. Lee, Enrico Moretti e Matthew J. Butler (2004), “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 3, 807-859.
  • Arend Lijphart (1999), Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven (CT): Yale University Press (tr. it. Luca Verzichelli, Le democrazie contemporanee, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001).
  • Erik R. Lindahl (1958), Just Taxation: a positive solution. In Richard Musgrave and Alan Peacock (a cura di), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Londra: Macmillan.
M
  • James Madison (1788), “The Federalist no. 51”, Independent Journal. Reperibile nel WWW: http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm.
  • Antonio Di Majo (2003), Lezioni di scienza delle finanze, 1a ed., Genova: ECIG.
  • Kenneth O. May (1952), “A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision”, Econometrica, Vol. 20, No. 4, 680-684.
  • Nicholas R. Miller (ultima revisione 2003), Minorities vs. Majorities: the Location of the Median in a Mixed Normal Distribution, Department of Political Science, University of Maryland Baltimore County. Reperibile nel WWW: http://userpages.umbc.edu/~nmiller/RESEARCH/MEDIAN.REV.pdf (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
  • Dennis C. Mueller (2003), Public choice III, 1a ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
N
  • William A. Niskanen (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
O
P
  • Fioravante Patrone (ultima revisione 2007), Teorema di May. Reperibile nel WWW: http://dri.diptem.unige.it/altro_materiale/teorema_di_May.pdf (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
  • Charles R. Plott (1967), “A Notion of Equilibrium and Possibility under Majority Rule”, American Journal Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, 787-806.
  • Werner W. Pommerehne (1978), “Institutional Approaches to Public Expenditures. Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 9, No. 9, 255-280.
  • Keith T. Poole e Howard Rosenthal (1997), Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Donatella della Porta (2002), Introduzione alla scienza politica, 1a ed., Bologna: Il Mulino.
R
  • Douglas W. Rea (1967), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven (CT):Yale University Press.
  • Harvey S. Rosen (2002), Public Finance, 6a ed., McGraw-Hill (tr. it. a cura di Chiara Rapallini (2003), Scienza delle Finanze, Milano: McGraw-Hill).

A cura di Charles K. Rowley e Friedrich G. Schneider (2008), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, 1a ed., Springer.

S
  • Paul A. Samuelson (1954), “The Theory of Public Expenditure”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4, 386-389.
  • Giovanni Sartori (1990), Elementi di teoria politica, Bologna: Il Mulino.
  • Joseph A. Schumpeter (1950), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper & Brother.
  • William F. Shughart II (2008), "Public Choice", The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Library of Economics and Liberty. Reperibile nel WWW: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
  • Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations (2007), a cura di S. M. Soares, MetaLibri Digital Library. Reperibile nel WWW: http://metalibri.wikidot.com/title:an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-of-nations:smith-a
  • Arthur Smithies (1941), “Optimum Location in Spatial Competition”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 49, No. 3, 423-439.
T
  • Gordon Tullock (1991), “Duncan Black: The Founding Father”, Public Choice, Vol. 71, No. 3, 125-128.
V
  • Luciano Violante (2006), Lettera ai giovani sulla Costituzione, 1a ed., Casale Monferrato (AL): Edizioni PIEMME.